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China represents one of the most pressing modern threats to the United States’ 
national security. This threat is best characterized by the opacity of China’s defense 
strategy, increasing uncertainty surrounding its intentions. While existing literature 
expounds global perceptions of China and determinants of public opinion, there is a gap 
when it comes to the nature of the relationship between China’s defense strategy and 
United States public opinion – one that has significant implications for United States 
policymaking and national security. Using sentiment analysis and topic modeling of 
China’s national defense white papers, this research examines (1) the tone and (2) the 
contents of China’s defense strategy as each relates to United States public opinion of 
China. The findings show no statistically significant relationship between either facet of 
China’s strategy and American public opinion, mitigating the risk posed by China’s 
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China represents one of the most pressing modern threats to the United States’ 
national security. Between the United States-China trade war that started in 2018, China-
attributed cyber-attacks on United States research institutions in early 2020, and the closing 
of United States and Chinese consulates later in the year, American headlines have been 
dominated by China and its security impact. In recent years, tension between China and 
the United States has increased, demonstrated by each country’s defense posture. The 
United States has explicitly identified China in almost every National Security Strategy 
since 1987,1 as well as the past three National Defense and National Intelligence Strategies, 
respectively.2 Similarly, since 1995, each of China’s defense strategies has mentioned the 
United States.3 Over time, the tone and contents of each country’s strategies have varied 
depending on the political and economic context. Recently, both China and the United 
States have included increasingly frequent references to the other as a key strategic 
competitor and security threat. 
Interpreting these strategies and their implications presents a key challenge, 
especially pertaining to those of China. China is well known for its use of “strategic 
ambiguity” and opacity in its national defense white papers (NDWPs), wherein it obscures 
its expansionary intentions with pacifying and vague language. 4  It is unclear how 
                                                          
1 “National Security Strategy Archive,” National Security Strategy Archive (The Taylor Group, 
2019), https://nssarchive.us/.  
2 “National Defense Strategy,” National Security Strategy Archive (The Taylor Group, 2018), 
https://nssarchive.us/national-defense-strategy/; “Reports & Publications,” Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2020), 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/. 
3 Andrew Erikson, “China Defense White Papers—1995-2019,” Andrew S. Erickson: China 
Analysis from Original Sources, July 23, 2019, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/china-defense-
white-papers-1995-2019-download-complete-set-read-highlights-here/ (accessed July 15, 2020). 
4 Miles Maochun Yu, “China's Strategic Ambiguity,” Hoover Institution (Stanford University, 




successful this strategy has been, however. The contradiction and lack of transparency 
found in China’s NDWPs has fostered uncertainty among global actors, particularly in the 
United States. As part of its strategy to expand its influence and alter the global power 
distribution, China seeks to improve international perceptions, operationalized in this 
research as United States public opinion. This is particularly salient due to the potential 
implications for the United States’ policymaking and national security. As a democracy, 
the United States government is responsive to public opinion in its policymaking. Should 
there be a connection between United States public opinion and China’s defense strategy, 
China could have a direct path to influence United States policy. Further, as a key strategic 
competitor, China seeks to expand its global power at the expense of the incumbent United 
States, negatively impacting American national interests.  
While there exists extensive literature on global opinion of China, China’s public 
diplomacy, and the causal mechanisms of public opinion, there is a dearth of material on 
the intersection of these subjects. China’s defense strategy lies at this nexus, serving as 
China’s primary means of communication and as a key tool for influencing international 
perceptions. This research seeks to close the gap in existing scholarship through 
determining the nature of the relationship between China’s defense strategy, as 
operationalized by its NDWPs, and United States public opinion of China.  Using sentiment 
analysis and topic modeling, it examines two components of China’s NDWPs – tone and 
contents – as they relate to Americans’ views on China. For both elements, the analysis 
shows no statistically significant relationship, indicating that there is not a meaningful 
association between China’s defense strategy and United States public opinion.  




interests. First, the lack of relationship between China’s defense strategy and United States 
public opinion lowers the risk of China’s direct access to the United States policymaking 
apparatus through influencing public opinion. Second, these findings indicate that China’s 
attempts to expand influence through its defense strategy have yet to be successful; there 
remains a gap between global perceptions of China and the image that it seeks to portray. 
China continues to challenge the global balance of power, but its inefficacy thus far lowers 
the risk it poses to the United States’ national security.  
The remaining sections of this paper explore these topics in greater detail. The 
following section examines existing literature, lays out the theoretical framework, and 
defines the research hypotheses. The subsequent section outlines the data and methodology 
used to test the hypotheses, followed by a section presenting and discussing the results, 
which show no statistically significant relationship between China’s defense strategy and 
United States public opinion. The final section explores the implications of these findings 
and considers areas for future research.  
3 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
3.1 China’s Defense Strategy 
Every few years, China publishes a national defense white paper outlining its 
defense strategy and defining its intentions for its global audience. These documents serve 
as “authoritative statements on national security”, 5  providing insight for international 
observers seeking to learn about China’s defense and strategic priorities. To date, eleven 
                                                          
5 Caitlin Campbell, “Highlights from China’s New Defense White Paper, ‘China’s Military 






papers have been published detailing select information regarding China’s interests, 
aspirations, and intentions.6 These documents serve as a means for China to promote its 
purported peaceful image, counter the “China threat”, and respond to international calls for 
transparency, while also providing a reference point regarding China’s intentions and their 
security implications for the international community.7  
Readers such as the United States Department of Defense, London’s International 
Institution for Strategic Studies, and the Economist have criticized China’s NDWPs for 
their “lack of transparency and substance” and the limited insight they provide into China’s 
objectives. 8 Officials in the United States and Asia-Pacific countries have highlighted the 
need for increased openness regarding China’s “military capabilities, activities, and 
intentions” to better gauge the threat posed to their national security. 9  China has 
historically engaged in “strategic ambiguity”, obfuscating its intentions by reassuring the 
public of its “peaceful development” and citing its military inferiority. Through employing 
ambiguous language and reciting its desires for peace and cooperation, China seeks to 
pacify its peers and deter potential adversaries.10 These tactics underpin China’s “two-
handed strategy”: at the surface, it is cooperative and agreeable, lowering its perceived 
threat, while quietly expanding and asserting itself in the global arena.11 This contradiction 
                                                          
6 Elsa Kania and Peter Wood, “Major Themes in China’s 2019 National Defense White Paper,” 
China Brief 19, no. 14 (July 31, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/major-themes-in-chinas-2019-
national-defense-white-paper/?mc_cid=cabc0abe69&amp;mc_eid=d8c8ced7d5.  
7 Jian Zhang, “China's Defense White Papers: a Critical Appraisal,” Journal of Contemporary 
China 21, no. 77 (2012): 881-898, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2012.684969.  
8 Zhang, “China's Defense White Papers,” 881-898. 
9 Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C Saunders, “Assessing Chinese Military Transparency,” China 
Perspectives (National Defense University Press, June 1, 2010), 
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/717807/assessing-chinese-military-transparency/.  
10 Yu, “China's Strategic Ambiguity.” 
11 Franklin J. Woo, “A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in 





paired with China’s disjointed message result in “confused, contested, uncertain, passive, 
and risk-averse” diplomacy, creating a chasm between China’s intentions and public 
perceptions.12 
Although China has become gradually more transparent, this chasm persists. While 
maintaining its strategic ambiguity, China has also become increasingly assertive.13 Its 
2015 NDWP elaborates on its military strategy and the increasingly complex security 
environment. Though the paper’s language is placatory, its contents show an increased 
focus on the centralization of power and the delicate balance between maintaining 
sovereignty and promoting peace.14 The 2019 NDWP does the same, renewing focus on 
strategic competition and the global balance of power and emphasizing military 
modernization and global engagement. However, as in 2015, the 2019 NDWP frames 
China’s military development and global expansion defensively and highlights the need 
for global peace. Between increasingly assertive military rhetoric and reassurances of a 
peaceful rise, it is unclear what China’s intended message is, causing uncertainty.   
3.2 Public Opinion and Global Influence 
It is clear that a gap exists between the image that China seeks to portray – a 
peaceful country on the rise – and how it is actually perceived: as a threat.15 Using the 
United States as a case study, this disconnect is illustrated by public opinion, which, over 
the past few decades, has deemed China’s rise to be an increasing threat. During the same 
                                                          
12 Angela Poh and Mingjiang Li, “A China in Transition: The Rhetoric and Substance of Chinese 
Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping,” Asian Security 13, no. 2 (2017): 84-97, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1286163.  
13 Poh and Li, “A China in Transition,” 84-97. 
14 Campbell, “Highlights.” 
15 Tao Xie and Benjamin I. Page, “What Affects China's National Image? A Cross-National Study 





period, public opinion of China has fallen. From 2005 until the most recent NDWP, the 
proportion of the United States public that has a “favorable” opinion of China has ranged 
from 35% to 52%, until 2019 when public opinion clocked in at only 26% favorable.16 A 
similar survey shows United States public opinion hovering between 39% and 45% 
favorable from the inception of China’s NDWPs until the year of the most recent 
publication, when it fell to 33% favorable. The same study shows that China has been 
considered one of the top five enemies of the United States over the past nine years, and 
that its economic power, military power, and conflict with Taiwan are seen as critical or 
important threats by the majority of respondents. 17  These statistics mirror the recent 
increase in China’s assertiveness and military rhetoric, suggesting that public opinion 
generally changes as expected relative to the sentiment and contents of China’s NDWPs.  
As indicated in China’s latest NDWP, strategic competition is a core tenet of its 
defense strategy, particularly as it pertains to the global balance of power. China seeks to 
increase its share of that power and influence how its distribution, favoring multipolarity 
in place of the current unipolarity. To accomplish this, China strives to expand its global 
influence through improving international perceptions.18 This research seeks to gauge the 
effectiveness of this strategy by using public opinion as a measure of China’s influence, 
exerted through its national defense white papers.  
This issue is particularly salient in the case of the United States, which has 
                                                          
16 “Global Indicators Database,” Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project (Pew Research 
Center, March 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/24/country/us/ (accessed June 
23, 2020).  
17 Gallup, “China,” Gallup.com (Gallup, March 31, 2020), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1627/china.aspx (accessed July 15, 2020).  




identified China as a key strategic competitor. 19  As an upcoming “superpower” 
challenging the incumbent, China’s strategy to increase its share of power directly 
challenges the United States as the primary provider of global security. China’s increasing 
influence threatens the United States’ current military freedom, regional access, and 
existing relationships on which it relies to protect its national interests.20 Because China 
presents such a threat to the United States’ national security, it is important to measure 
China’s global influence through identifying the drivers of public opinion. Understanding 
the underlying factors contributing to China’s expanding influence is critical to countering 
the security risk posed to the United States. 
Due to the lack of direct interaction between the United States public and China, 
opinion is largely formed through media and government filters.21 Due to its reliance on 
readily available information, the public is likely to mirror the sentiment of government 
and media viewpoints, which could be formed from potentially biased secondary sources. 
Filtering notwithstanding, public opinion of China is driven by perceptions of both hard 
and soft power. Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments”; hard power is a coercive approach determined by matters such 
as the military and economy.22 The “hard” drivers of China’s global influence include 
economic and military power, foreign trade, foreign investment, and market openness.23 
                                                          
19 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1045785.pdf.  
20 Michael D Swaine and Ashley J Tellis, “Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and 
Future” (RAND Corporation, 2000), www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mr1121af.  
21 Xie and Page, “What Affects China’s National Image?”, 850-867.  
22Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and 
Prospects,” Asian Survey 48, no. 3 (2008): 453-472, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2008.48.3.453.  
23 Gallup, “China”; “How Are Global Views on China Trending?” ChinaPower Project. Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, March 20, 2020. https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views/ (accessed 




The “soft” drivers include culture, political values, and foreign policy, 24  as well as 
socioeconomic conditions and education, 25  human rights and governance, 26  and 
environmental impact and government corruption.27 The expected relationship between 
China’s national defense white papers and American opinion relies on their shared linkage 
with the causal mechanisms of public opinion; to the extent that the NDWPs embody these 
intermediary variables, they are associated with United States public opinion, and by 
extension, public policy. 
A core tenant of democracy is that a legitimate government is responsive to the 
public. Accordingly, significant linkages exist between public opinion and policy.28 While 
early theories posited that public opinion was relatively impotent in the formulation of 
policy, recent studies have shown the opposite. This is driven by the fact that policymakers’ 
reelection is conditional on public support. One study found significant “correspondence 
between public preferences and United States policy” relating to China due to the 
possibility of electoral retribution by voters. A similar trend was found between public 
opinion and policy relating to arms control. 29  These case studies suggest that public 
opinion is especially highly correlated with policy decisions relating to foreign policy and 
                                                          
24 Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 94-109, www.jstor.org/stable/25097996.  
25 Shin-wha Lee, (2011), The Theory and Reality of Soft Power: Practical Approaches in East 
Asia, 10.1057/9780230118447_2.  
26 Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 153-71, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580.  
27 Xie and Page, “What Affects China’s National Image?”, 850-867. 
28 Paul Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda,” 
Political Research Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2003): 29, https://doi.org/10.2307/3219881.  
29 Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann 
Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 4 




defense spending, particularly when it comes to salient and enduring issues like China.30 
It follows, then, that public opinion of China impacts public policy. This suggests 
that to the extent that it relates to United States public opinion, China’s defense strategy 
impacts United States policy. The potential risk of this connection is obvious: China could 
deliver its strategy to influence public opinion and policy to its advantage, such as with 
favorable trade, military, or foreign policies. Because of these policymaking and national 
security implications, it is critical to understand the effectiveness of China’s strategy to 
expand its global influence, particularly as it pertains to the United States.  
3.3 Hypotheses 
As China looks to bridge the gap between the image it seeks to portray and 
American perceptions, it is imperative to measure its success. While there is considerable 
scholarship on China’s public diplomacy, global opinions of China, and determinants of 
public opinion, there is less on the combination of the three. Existing literature on the 
determinants of United States public opinion of China is limited, especially as they relate 
to China’s defense strategy. This research seeks to determine the nature of the relationship 
between China’s defense strategy, as operationalized by its national defense white papers, 
and United States public opinion to measure China’s expanding influence. 
China’s defense strategy has two components: tone and content. Whether either has 
a meaningful relationship with United States public opinion remains largely unanswered 
by existing literature. As a public diplomacy tool, the NDWPs are a logical means by which 
China seeks to achieve its strategic objectives, expanding power through driving the 
                                                          
30 Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," The American 




determinants of public opinion. Public opinion is generally responsive to the sentiment of 
the information from which it is formed.31 From this, the following is derived:  
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between the sentiment of China’s 
defense white papers and United States public opinion of China, where a change in 
sentiment is associated with a change in United States public opinion.  
Regarding the contents of China’s defense strategy, existing literature concludes 
the following to be significant drivers of public opinion: military development, economic 
and fiscal policy, foreign policy, political ideals, social development, and culture. 
Assuming China’s NDWPs represent these determinants, a second hypothesis is derived:  
H2: The contents of China’s national defense white papers are representative of the 
determinants of public opinion of China. The extent to which the topics of the white papers 
include military development, economic and fiscal policy, foreign policy, political ideals, 
social development, and culture has a statistically significant relationship with United 
States public opinion. 
4 Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses, data are leveraged from “China Defense White Papers: 
1995 – 2019” and Roper iPoll. The site, “China Defense White Papers: 1995 – 2019,” is a 
repository of China’s NDWPs compiled from various internet sources by Dr. Andrew 
Erikson, professor and founder of the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies 
Institute.32 There are eleven total documents, published in 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
                                                          
31 Xiuli Wang and Pamela J. Shoemaker, “What Shapes Americans' Opinion of China? Country 
Characteristics, Public Relations and Mass Media,” Chinese Journal of Communication 4, no. 1 (2011):1-
20, https://doi.org/10.1080/17544750.2011.544079.  
32 Andrew Erikson, “About Andrew Erikson,” Andrew S. Erickson, 2019, 




2006, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2015, and 2019, respectively.33 For this study, each document is 
scraped and featurized to represent China’s defense strategy for that year. 
Roper iPoll is an archive of survey and public opinion data sponsored by Cornell 
University’s Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, containing thousands of survey 
questions and datasets from cross-industry polling organizations. 34  This study uses 
Gallup’s News Service and Organization polls, which survey a national sample of United 
States adults via telephone, with sample sizes ranging from 979 and 1054 respondents. 
Data are gathered from the most proximate survey after each NDWP’s publication. In most 
cases, the survey occurs within one year; the exception is the 2015 NDWP, for which public 
opinion data were not collected until 21 months after publication. Each year, public opinion 
is measured by a survey asking: “Is your overall opinion of...China...very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?”. Responses are reported as a 
percentage across four categories: “favorable”, “mostly favorable”, “mostly unfavorable”, 
and “very unfavorable”, and then are condensed to “percentage of favorable responses” 
(“favorable” and “mostly favorable”) and “percentage of unfavorable responses” (“mostly 
unfavorable” and “very unfavorable”). “Percentage of favorable responses” (Favorability) 
is the dependent variable for H1 and H2. As shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, Favorability 
fluctuates significantly between 33% and 50%, and falls drastically in 2019. 
                                                          
33 Erikson, “China Defense White Papers,” (accessed July 15, 2020).  
34 “What We Do,” What we do | Roper Center for Public Opinion Research (Cornell University, 





Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max  
Favorability 55 0.428 0.047 0.330 0.390 0.470 0.500 
Sentiment 55 0.875 0.286 0.230 0.680 1.075 1.470 
Economy 55 0.026 0.007 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 
Military 55 0.051 0.010 0.030 0.040 0.060 0.070 
Foreign 55 0.014 0.007 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030 
Political 55 0.043 0.009 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 
Social 55 0.017 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.030 
Cultural 55 0.0004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
For H1, the sentiment of the NDWPs serves as the independent variable. To 
engineer this variable from the web-scraped documents, sentiment analysis is conducted 
using the SentimentR package in R, employed previously by similar analyses.35 To 
reduce noise, the texts are stemmed and cleaned to remove URLs, numbers, punctuation, 
capitalization, non-ASCII characters, and stopwords, resulting in a range of 7,463 to 22,927 
features per document. Because only eleven NDWPs have been published, the population 
size is rather small. To reduce standard error, five random samples of 1,000 features are 
                                                          
35 James E Sanders, “Similarities and Differences in the Argumentative Characteristics of the 





drawn from each document, increasing the sample to 55 texts. Sentiment analysis is run to 
calculate the average sentiment (Sentiment) of each text, shown in Figure 2. SentimentR 
uses dictionary-lookup methods with a lexicon of 11,709 words to assess the sentiment of 
each feature, rated on a scale of 19 values from -2.0 to 1.0: less than -1 signals valence 
shifters, -1.0 to 0.0 is negative, 0.0 is neutral, and 0.0 to 1.0 is positive.36 As illustrated in 
Table 1, Sentiment is positive for all texts, ranging from 0.23 to 1.47 with a mean of 0.88.  
 
For H2, the topics of the NDWPs serve as the independent variables. As with 
sentiment, the topic variables need to be engineered, this time through topic modeling. 
Using the tm package, the NDWP texts are converted to a document term matrix and are 
stemmed and cleaned to remove non-English characters, stopwords, numbers, 
capitalization, symbols, URLs, and punctuation. Again, because of the limitations 
presented by a population size of 11 documents, five random samples of 1,000 features are 
drawn from each, increasing the sample to 55 texts. Supervised dictionary methods are 
                                                          
36 Maurizio Naldi, “A Review of Sentiment Computation Methods with R Packages” ArXiv 
abs/1901.08319 (2019): 1-11, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.08319.pdf (accessed July 18, 2020); Tyler Rinker, 
“SentimentR v2.7.1,” R Documentation, 2019, 




applied through the quanteda package to classify the cleaned text into topics, using the 
LexiCoder Policy Agenda (LPA) dictionary. The LPA dictionary, compiled by the 
Comparative Agendas Project, contains 28 topics relating to media, legislature, and policy 
and has been used previously to classify political texts.37 To better align with H2, the 28 
topics are consolidated to six: Economy, Military, Foreign, Political, Social, and Cultural. 
Each topic is supplemented with context-specific terms to increase relevance to the 
NDWPs. The final dictionary, found in the Appendix, is applied to the NDWP samples to 
calculate the proportion of topics in each text, illustrated in Figure 3. Topic shares range 
from 0.0% to 7.0%, with means ranging from 0.04% to 5.1%, as detailed in Table 1.  
 
Note: Topic shares do not add to 1.0 due to the features in each text that do not fall into any 
of the six topics. These are considered neutral and are excluded from analysis. 
 
Both H1 and H2 are tested using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression; 
analysis of residuals suggests that each variable is drawn from a normal distribution, 
indicating that linear regression is suitable. Favorability is regressed on Sentiment, 
Economy, Military, Foreign, Political, Social, and Cultural, and the results are evaluated 
                                                          
37 Julie Sevenans et al., “The Automated Coding of Policy Agendas: A Dictionary Based 






at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels.38  
5 Results 
5.1 Key Findings  
This research begins with two hypotheses theorizing that (1) the tone and (2) the 
contents of China’s defense strategy are significantly related to United States public 
opinion of China. It is expected that differences in sentiment among China’s national 
defense white papers are associated with the variance in the proportion of the American 
public that views China favorably. It is also expected that the respective proportions of the 
topics in each NDWP – economy, military, foreign affairs, political ideals, social issues, 
and culture – are associated with the proportion of Americans with favorable views. In 
exploring each of these relationships, this research finds that there is not, in fact, any 
meaningful association between either the tone or the contents of China’s defense strategy 
and United States public opinion of China.  
5.1.1 Sentiment 
After conducting regression analysis to test H1, this study fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship between the sentiment of 
China’s national defense white papers and United States public opinion of China. In short, 
the changes in United States public opinion over time are not associated with changes in 
the sentiment of China’s defense strategy. For Sentiment, the OLS regression results in a 
                                                          
38 To avoid post-treatment bias, control variables were not included, as most determinants of public opinion 
follow from the strategy stated in China’s NDWPs. Additionally, the inclusion of interaction terms introduces 
significant multicollinearity and has no impact on the statistical significance of the correlation coefficients; 




correlation coefficient of -0.011 and a p-value of 0.676, as illustrated in Table 2. This 
indicates that on average, a one-point increase in the sentiment of China’s white papers is 
associated with a 1.0 percentage-point decrease in the proportion of the United States 
public that views China favorably, an extremely weak negative relationship. However, 
because the p-value for Sentiment far exceeds any standard level of significance, this 
relationship is not statistically significant. This suggests that United States public opinion 
is not associated with the sentiment of the NDWPs, despite the logic that public opinion 
would tend to worsen where there is more negative rhetoric. Ultimately, contrary to the 
theory posited in H1, there is no meaningful relationship between the tone of China’s 
defense strategy and the United States’ views on China, leaving the variance in United 
States public opinion yet unexplained.  
Table 2. OLS Regression for NDWP Sentiment and Topics 
 






 p = 0.174   
Military -0.304 
 (0.712) 
 p = 0.672   
Foreign -0.745 
 (1.102) 
 p = 0.503   
Political -0.494 
 (0.783) 
 p = 0.531   
Social -0.698 
 (1.135) 






 p = 0.490   
Sentiment -0.011 
 (0.025) 
 p = 0.676   
Constant 0.457*** 
 (0.057) 
 p = 0.000    
Observations 55 
R2 0.068 
Adjusted R2 -0.071 
Residual Std. Error 0.049 (df = 47) 
F Statistic 0.488 (df = 7; 47)  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
5.1.2 Content 
Using the same OLS regression to test H2, this study again fails to reject the null 
hypothesis, finding that there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
contents of China’s national defense white papers and United States public opinion of 
China. As shown in Table 2, the correlation coefficients for the NDWP topic shares have 
a broad range, spanning from -0.745 to 2.538. Military, Foreign, Political, and Social all 
have negative, statistically insignificant values. Military has a correlation coefficient of  
-0.304 and a p-value of 0.672, suggesting that a one-percentage-point increase in the 
proportion of a NDWP text classified as Military is associated with a 0.3 percentage-point 
decrease in the proportion of Americans that view China favorably. Foreign has a 
correlation coefficient of -0.745 and a p-value of 0.503, suggesting that a one-percentage-
point increase in the Foreign proportion of an NDWP is associated on average with a 0.7 
percentage-point decrease in Favorability. Political has a correlation coefficient of -0.494 




proportion is associated on average with a 0.5 percentage-point decrease in Favorability. 
Finally, Social has a correlation coefficient of -0.698 and a p-value of 0.542, which 
suggests that a one-percentage-point decrease in the share of the NDWP classified as Social 
is associated on average with a 0.7 percentage-point decrease in Favorability. Although 
the magnitude of these coefficients is relatively low, their negativity suggests that more 
frequent inclusion of military, foreign, political, or social matters in China’s defense 
strategy is associated with a decline in United States opinion of China. However, because 
the p-value of each of these topic variables is considerably greater than any standard level 
of significance, none has a statistically significant relationship with the proportion of the 
American public that views China favorably 
Economy and Cultural have positive coefficients, suggesting that an increase in 
their respective proportions of China’s national defense white papers is associated with an 
improvement in United States public opinion of China, though the association is 
statistically insignificant. These topics have the largest magnitude of all topic variable 
coefficients, suggesting a comparatively greater impact on Favorability. Economy has a 
correlation coefficient of 1.434 and a p-value of 0.174, indicating that on average, a one-
percentage-point increase in the proportion of the NDWP text classified as Economy is 
associated with a 1.4 percentage-point increase in the proportion of the American public 
that views China favorably. Cultural has a correlation coefficient of 2.538 and a p-value of 
0.490, suggesting that a one-percentage-point increase in the Cultural proportion is 
associated on average with a 2.5 percentage-point increase in the proportion of favorable 
views of China. These positive relationships suggest that United States public opinion is 




matters more frequently. However, as with Military, Foreign, Political, and Social, the p-
values for Economy and Cultural exceed standard levels of significance, and thus are not 
statistically significant. It is worth noting that Economy has the lowest p-value of the topic 
variables, nearing significant levels; additional national defense white papers would 
improve the standard error and clarify both the magnitude and significance of relationship 
between the white paper topics and United States public opinion of China.  
The null findings for both H1 and H2 are supported by the regression’s adjusted R-
squared value of -0.071, which indicates that a negligible amount of the variance in United 
States public opinion can be attributed to the topics and sentiment of China’s defense 
strategy. The OLS regression model thus has low explanatory power when confined to the 
six topic variables and the sentiment variable, once again leaving the public opinion 
variance in Figure 1 unexplained. In general, this research fails to establish a relationship 
between China’s defense strategy and United States public opinion of China. Although the 
magnitude and direction of the coefficient on each variable are potentially meaningful, the 
low explanatory power of the model and the lack of statistical significance indicates that 
neither the tone nor the topics of China’s defense strategy is meaningfully related to United 
States public opinion of China.  
5.2 Strategic Inefficacy 
That neither aspect of China’s defense strategy is meaningfully related to American 
public opinion has significant implications for the United States’ national security and is a 
critical topic for further study.  The null findings for both hypotheses suggest that the 
change in United States public opinion of China from 1995 to 2019 does not directly 




to tone, the lack of relationship with American public opinion implies that China’s two-
handed strategy has not been as effective in swaying global perceptions as intended. 
China’s use of vague and placatory language to disguise its expansionary objectives does 
result in positive sentiment; however, that positive sentiment does not have any meaningful 
association with change in perceptions of China. Regarding content, to the extent that the 
NDWP topics are representative of the elements of China’s defense strategy, there is not a 
clear association between the strategy’s contents and the proportion of Americans that view 
China favorability. This is likely a result of the contradictions typical of China’s strategic 
communications, such as calls for peace followed by thinly veiled military threats. These 
inconsistencies have resulted in an unclear message and leave the global audience 
uncertain; this explains the disconnect between what China’s defense strategy says and 
how the United States public feels. The incongruous positive sentiment of the defense 
strategies further obfuscates their contents, causing even greater confusion and failing to 
effectively convey China’s true strategic objectives.   
The enduring uncertainty surrounding China’s intentions suggests that the chasm 
persists between global perceptions of China and the image that China seeks to portray. 
Based on this case study of the United States, China has yet to successfully increase 
transparency, improve its international image, or expand influence through its defense 
strategy. China’s intentions remain as opaque as ever due to the persistent ambiguity and 
characteristic contradictions of its strategy.  China’s image, as measured by United States 
public opinion, is shown to be unchanged vis-à-vis its defense strategy. The proportion of 
Americans that view China favorably averages below 50%, shown in Table 1, suggesting 




ineffective. China depends on public diplomacy and positive global perceptions to achieve 
its goals; its inefficacy thus far demonstrates that its defense strategy has not been an 
effective means by which to expand influence. These findings do not bode well for China’s 
pursuit of power. The lack of meaningful relationship between China’s defense strategy 
and Americans’ views of China indicates that it has a way to go in shifting the global 
balance of power in its favor. As it stands today, United States public opinion remains 
largely untouched by China’s national defense strategy, and the strategic competition 
between the two countries endures.   
5.3 National Security Implications 
The implications of these findings are encouraging for the United States’ national 
security. First, because public opinion is a key driver of policy formulation in the United 
States, especially for foreign and defense issues, the possibility that China could impose 
direct influence on the American public poses a threat to the United States’ policymaking 
apparatus. Were China to deliver its strategy in a way that influences the public to promote 
policies that would benefit China, there would be an increased risk to the United States’ 
national security. Such policy decisions might be counter to the United States’ national 
interests, whether regarding the economy, foreign policy, or the military, undermining the 
integrity of American democratic process and potentially damaging the United States’ 
standing in the global arena. The lack of association between China’s defense strategy and 
United States public opinion diminishes the risk of such subversive policymaking and 
protects the United States’ integrity and national security interests.  
Second, as the incumbent power in a unipolar world, and one of China’s primary 




the global balance of power. The United States’ national security is contingent on its 
present military superiority, global access, economic prosperity, and network of alliances, 
all of which serve to protect American national interests. These conditions are directly 
challenged by China’s expanding influence, which comes at the United States’ expense. 
However, as illustrated by the findings of this research, China has yet to be entirely 
effective at extending its influence. This implies that the balance of power remains 
unaffected by China’s use of its defense strategy as a public diplomacy tool, and that the 
United States’ national interests and current standing among global actors endure. 
However, a new threat to the United States’ national security is introduced by China’s 
inability to reduce the uncertainty surrounding its intentions. As a barometer for China’s 
strategic objectives and the security implications thereof, China’s defense strategy has done 
little to address calls for better transparency, increasing the risk of a global security 
dilemma.39 How this will impact China’s strategy-making and the United States’ national 
security interests is sure to play a role in the ongoing strategic competition. 
The findings of this research suggest that China’s defense strategy has done little 
to achieve its expansionary goals or address global uncertainty, perpetuating the chasm 
between the image China seeks to project and global perceptions.  Both access to the United 
States’ policymaking apparatus and infringement on the United States’ present status as a 
global power represent critical national security threats. However, this study’s finding that 
there is no meaningful relationship between China’s defense strategy and United States 
public opinion of China indicates that, despite the additional risks to global security, 
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American national interests remain unharmed, diminishing the overall threat posed to the 
United States’ national security.  
6 Conclusion 
This research finds that neither the tone nor the contents of China’s defense strategy 
has a meaningful association with United States public opinion of China. Using OLS 
regression to test both H1 and H2, it fails to reject the null hypotheses, showing no 
statistically significant relationship between either component of China’s national defense 
white papers and American views on China. These findings have significant implications 
for the United States’ national security. They indicate that China’s effort to shift global 
perceptions and expand influence using its national defense strategy have not been as 
productive as intended, likely due to its strategic ambiguity and characteristic 
contradictions. As a result, China has not been successful in shaping United States public 
opinion, and by extension, public policy. This finding reduces the risk of a direct line of 
influence between China and the United States policymaking apparatus, which could 
otherwise damage the United States’ national interests. Additionally, China’s strategic 
inefficacy does little to sway the global balance of power, which currently leans in the 
United States’ favor. This is advantageous for American national interests, which may be 
undermined by China’s encroachment on the United States’ position as the primary 
provider of global security.   
These results bode well for the United States, whose resources are spread thin 
across a multitude of defense initiatives. Because China’s expansionary strategy has shown 
no association with United States public opinion to date, policymakers may consider 




efficient use of limited time, funding, and political capital. This should be done, however, 
with careful consideration; China’s defense strategy is likely to evolve over time, as are its 
tactics to expand influence at the expense of the United States.  
This research seeks to address the gap in existing literature relating to China’s 
public diplomacy, global perceptions of China, and causal mechanisms of public opinion 
through determining the nature of the relationship between China’s defense strategy and 
United States public opinion. In general, the null findings contradict prior theories, which 
would portend an association between China’s defense strategy and American views based 
on the strategy’s linkage with the determinants of public opinion. Of course, in exploring 
this relationship, this research does have limitations. The most significant of these is the 
assumption that China’s NDWPs are representative of the causal mechanisms of United 
States public opinion. The null findings and low explanatory power of the regression model 
suggest that alone, China’s white papers may not effectively characterize the intermediary 
variables that drive United States public opinion; if they did, there would likely be a 
statistically significant relationship. This could be a result of the feature engineering 
performed to operationalize the tone and contents of China’s defense strategy, or an 
indication that other causal mechanisms were not included in the regression. As with any 
research, the potential for omitted variable bias exists due to the possibility of overlooked 
variables, contributing to the low explanatory power of the model.  
There is also the question of generalizability – this research is a case study on the 
relationship between China’s defense strategy and public opinion in the United States. 
Because the NDWP topics in this analysis were constructed to be representative of the 




other countries. For instance, economic matters such as China’s trade practices may be less 
salient in a country that does not interact with China in the global marketplace. Further 
research into the causal mechanisms of public opinion of China would help determine 
external validity of the findings. Additional constraints of this research include its small 
sample size, variance in the lag between white paper publication and public opinion 
surveys, the applicability of the selected sentiment and topic dictionaries, and overfitting 
of the topic model due to dictionary customization. 
A natural continuation of this research might explore the “why” behind the null 
findings. Paired with the low explanatory power of the regression model, the statistically 
insignificant results indicate that there may be other variables that should be considered. 
The national defense white papers are representative of the common drivers of public 
opinion, China’s hard and soft power. One path for future research is to examine alternative 
explanations of American views on China that are not driven by the white papers. These 
might include information about the individual survey respondents, or variables 
representing government and media information filters. It would also be interesting to test 
the same hypotheses for other global actors. Modifying the model to measure other 
countries’ views on China would shed light on whether the lack of relationship between 
China’s defense strategy and public opinion is specific to the United States, or if it is more 
broadly applicable. This would help determine external validity and contribute to a wider 
understanding of China’s defense strategy and its impact to global security.  
Ultimately, the null findings of this research are a valuable addition to the existing 
body of literature on global opinion of China, China’s public diplomacy, and the causal 




defense strategy and American views on China has significant national security 
implications and has the potential to inform policymakers’ decisions in the United States’ 
ongoing strategic competition with China.  
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